




Africa’s Recovery from the Global Economic Crisis 
Augustin Fosu and Wim Naudé 
African economies have been shaken by the global economic downturn which followed the US-
centered financial crisis of 2008. Africa’s growth rate for 2009 and 2010 has recently been 
revised substantially downwards by international financial institutions. For instance the IMF has 
revised Africa’s economic growth forecasts for 2009 downwards from 5 per cent in October 
2008, to 3.5 per cent in January 2009, and to 1.7 per cent in April 2009. Likewise the World 
Bank has revised African growth prospects down to 2.4 per cent for 2009. The consequences of  
a reduction in growth, even if African economies may avoid shrinking, are likely to be higher 
unemployment and poverty, increases in infant mortality, and adverse coping with long-lasting 
impacts such as higher school drop-out rates, reductions in healthcare, environmental 
degradation, and political instability, inter alia.  
Long-term development prospects are detrimentally affected by the volatility of growth in 
Africa, and the region’s overall dismal growth until recently was associated with such volatility. 
Indeed, the standard deviation of GDP growth in Africa since the 1960s is the highest amongst 
developing regions as Fosu (2007) indicated in an earlier piece in the WIDER Angle. The 
experience of Africa with growth has therefore been one of upswings and downswings. In this 
light, the current global economic downturn follows as one of a number of adverse shocks which 
had been suffered, for various reasons, by African countries since independence.  
In this article we discuss some of the steps which can be taken to minimize the impact on Africa 
and speed up recovery. Given that African countries should heed the lessons from past external 
crises we also argue that countries should avoid action which could introduce anti-growth ‘policy 
syndromes’ (Fosu, 2007). 
Putting the Crisis in Perspective  
Unlike previous crises, Africa faces this crisis with much better indicators of macro-economic 
resilience, such as better fiscal and trade balances, and improved governance.  
Figure 1 depicts GDP growth in Africa since 1961 in relation to world average GDP growth and 





Fig 1. GDP growth in Africa, 1961 – 2007 including forecast growth for 2009 and 2010 according to 
the IMF  
(Sources of data: World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online, and IMF) 
Figure 1 shows that African economic growth is dependent on world economic growth, and that 
declines in world growth tend to lead to declines in African growth. But what can be seen from 
the figure is that compared to the early 1980s and early 1990s, when African GDP growth 
declined faster than the world’s and was even negative both times, the current forecasts are that 
African GDP will not contract, despite the severity of the global crisis. Of course, whether these 
forecasts will be borne out will have to be seen, although there is comfort in the fact that African 
economies are more resilient this time around than during earlier crises. 
Africa’s Greater Resilience 
Figure 2 compares the average current account and fiscal balances for African countries, as well 
as foreign exchange reserves and subsequent growth (forecast in the case of 2008-09) between 


















































































Fig.2. Comparison of Africa’s macro-economic position with the situation before previous 
synchronised global recessions  (Source of data: International Monetary Fund) 
What is clear from the figure above is that African countries are in a much better position this 
time around. This is the result not only of the very good economic growth which African 
countries experienced on average since 2000, which had been helped along by strong commodity 
prices, but it is also the result of better macro-economic management. In the terminology of the 
African Economic Consortium’s (AERCs) Growth Project (see the references contained in Fosu, 
2007) there has been more ‘syndrome-free’ policy periods in Africa in recent years. 
This greater resilience makes possible a wider range of responses towards recovery in Africa. In 
particular, as we show elsewhere in greater detail (see Fosu and Naudé, 2009), fine tuning the 
appropriate responses for Africa should take note of individual country vulnerabilities and 
resilience. Although Africa’s general resilience is better, as Figure 2 suggests, there are still 
important differences between countries, which need to be accommodated in crafting policy 
responses. Bearing this in mind, the best framework within which such a country-level tailoring 
of responses and assistance can take place is one that makes a distinction between risk 
mitigation, risk coping and risk reduction.  
Mitigation, Coping and Risk Reduction in Africa 
Mitigation actions, to be undertaken by both the international community and African countries 
should include:  
•  Monitoring the impact of the crisis in timely fashion 





























•  Expanding trade (including through aid for trade programmes) and avoiding falling into 
creeping protectionism 
•  Expanding trade finance  
The expansion of trade is perhaps the most crucial measure needed, as much of the adverse 
shock to Africa is due to the decline in its exports. Expanding African countries’ trade however 
is largely dependent on the international community. So efforts to restore growth in the advanced 
economies are vital. The sooner these economies can turn around, the better it will be for Africa. 
Moreover, it needs to be done without resorting to (‘murky’) protectionism, which has now been 
identified as a real danger to global trade. Efforts to expand trade finance, through for instance  
regional multilateral finance institutions such as the African Development Bank, would 
complement donor countries’ trade-for-aid programmes and preferential trade access for African 
products. 
The role of African governments in mitigation would be to: 
•  Monitor the impact of the crisis 
•  Monitor and regulate their own banking systems and check for early signs of bank 
difficulty 
•   Maintain a positive stance towards trade liberalization and open markets 
•  Lobby for the satisfactory conclusion of the Doha (development) Round 
•  Work towards improving their respective supply capacities, for instance through public 
works programmes aimed at infrastructure and transport services 
•  Maintain competitive real exchange rates   
•  Further encourage regional integration and regional trade facilitation measures. 
Coping actions, largely the responsibility of individual countries but needing some assistance 
from donors, would include: 
•  Expanding domestic demand, through fiscal and monetary stimulus, where possible, in a 
manner that does not lead to unsustainable debt accumulation 
•  Absorbing financial losses through foreign reserves, where countries have the means and 
allowing establishment of competitive exchange rates 
•  Targeting the vulnerable through appropriate social safety nets supported by aid 
•  Expanding self-employment, through amongst others making the business environment 
easier and supporting public works programmes 
•  Utilizing technical assistance in the design and implementation of programmes 
•  Expanding peacekeeping operations where needed, given the potential for escalating 
conflict in times of economic hardship 
In assisting countries to cope with the effects of the crisis, the international community needs to 
be more alert to country-level differences, paying particular attention to countries most at risk 
and ensuring tailor-made assistance.  Such assistance would be twofold, namely to: 5 
 
•  Assist African governments with financial resources so as to alleviate poverty and to 
make aid as effective as possible (care should be taken that aid is appropriately utilized 
and that it does not divert local production) 
•  Provide technical assistance and if needed peacekeeping operations  
African governments in turn should take care that expansionary policies do not lead to 
unsustainable budget deficits or debt burdens, and that private sector activity is made more 
attractive.  
Finally, in the long run, risks facing African countries should be reduced, via, for instance, 
diversification of their economies, improving the environment for doing business, and reforming 
the global financial and aid architecture. A prerequisite is the strengthening of governance, both 
domestic and global. Many African countries have improved their governance through 
institutional reform in recent years. It is also true, though, that many nations on the continent are 
still lagging behind in institutional reforms. An important concern for a number of these 
countries is that such reforms could be fraught with potential political disorder, requiring 
appropriate support to these countries in order to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Conversely, 
we must also be cognizant of the need to preserve the achievements of those countries that have 
succeeded in reforming. That would require appropriate support to reduce the potential for 
political opportunism in these countries during the time of the crisis, which could reverse the 
success so far. Meanwhile, commitments to improve governance of the global architecture of 
resource assistance to African countries should translate into action.  
Towards Syndrome-Free Recovery 
A policy environment is seen as syndrome-free (‘SF’) if it is largely free from broad anti-growth 
policy syndromes, such as state controls, adverse redistribution, sub-optimal intertemporal 
allocation, and state breakdown. These are briefly explained in Fosu (2007). Fosu (2009) finds 
that the absence of such policy syndromes could have increased annual per capita GDP growth in 
Africa by nearly 3.0 percentage points.   
The urgency to implement the short-term measures described above should avoid compromising 
the achievements so far of increased SF environments that might result in countries relapsing 
into policy syndromes. In this regard, we point to five dangers that should be avoided. We 
elaborate these in a companion paper which has been prepared for a Side Event on Africa at the 
UN Conference on Economic and Financial Crisis which takes place on 25 June 2009 in New 
York (see http://www.ony.unu.edu/events-forums/upcoming/2009/towards-an-action-plan-for-
afr.html). These five dangers are:  
1.  Creating another boom-bust cycle and inflaming the historically high volatility of African 
growth. With greater resilience, Africa may yet avoid a recession and should be able to 
recover without inducing an unsustainable inflationary boom. 
2.  Generating another debt crisis. Africa’s boom-bust cycles of the past have often been 
accompanied by cycles of sovereign indebtedness and led many African economies to be 6 
 
caught in a debt trap in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of these countries have benefitted from 
the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI). The current crisis is likely, however, to put pressure on both developing 
country expenditure and revenue, with the likelihood of growing debt.  
3.  Exacerbating inequality and polarization, possibly resulting in state failure, for instance. 
Appropriate measures could include strengthening social safety nets, as well as public work-
type expenditure such as on trade and transport infrastructure, which will not only create 
short-term jobs but also provide vital productive infrastructure. 
4.  Reversing gains made in opening up African economies and re-introducing crippling state 
controls such as higher tariffs, price controls, or sectoral subsidies. 
5.  Finally, advanced countries should avoid entrenching inequities and inefficiencies in the 
global financial and aid architecture. The latter is a particular risk inherent in the G20’s 
response to the crisis and requires a more inclusive response on the level of the UN, as Naudé 
(2009) recently pointed out in the April 2009 WIDER Angle. 
Conclusion 
We believe that Africa can and will recover from the current crisis. In this paper we have called 
for a ‘syndrome-free’ (SF) recovery, which is a recovery that will not contain the seeds of its 
own destruction. We are optimistic that Africa will heed the lessons of the past, and through 
improved governance be able to steer clear of pitfalls. The international community should also 
play its role in ensuring that trade channels to Africa are kept open; that promised aid is 
distributed and at an accelerated pace; that irresponsible lending (which could lead to a debt 
crisis in a few years) is avoided; and that fiscal stimuli and bank bailouts in the West do not 
inadvertently entrench the status quo of the current unsatisfactory global financial architecture.  
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